

Risky (Natural) Assets: When Does Stochasticity Matter for Valuing Natural Capital?

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Joshua K. Abbott^a, Eli P. Fenichel^b, Seong D. Yun^c

^a*School of Sustainability, Arizona State University*

^b*Yale School of the Environment, Yale University*

^c*Department of Agricultural Economics, Mississippi State University*

Abstract

The treatment of risk in respect to natural capital has focused on its implications for optimal management, with little attention being paid to the question of how risk alters the *valuation* of natural assets. We extend the theory of natural capital valuation in non-optimized systems to account for the effects of stochasticity in the dynamics of the natural capital, showing how risk alters the marginal valuation of natural capital through an “endogenous risk” effect and through an “endogenous risk aversion” effect that depend in complex ways on the properties of the welfare function from instantaneous consumption of natural capital, the properties of the natural capital dynamics, the stochastic process, and the economic program linking capital stocks and their human use. We also derive a formula showing how sub-optimal management influences the valuation of natural capital. Using canonical single-stock examples we demonstrate that in some cases these two risk effects may approximately balance so that risk has little effect on valuation. However, we demonstrate that risk can have large and complex effects on valuation when resource dynamics involve non-convexities.

Keywords: Natural capital, Stochasticity, Risk, Sustainability, Wealth Accounting, Green Accounting

1. Introduction

Risk and uncertainty are a longstanding concern in natural resource economics and real-world resource management. Most research in this domain focuses on the management implications of risk for decision making – how the presence of risk or uncertainty alters the optimal control rule. Accordingly, there is a large literature applying stochastic optimal control theory to the optimal management of resources subject to stochastic shocks (LaRiviere et al., 2017). Tools from robust control are increasingly used to address decision making under Knightian model uncertainty. (e.g., Rodriguez et al., 2011; Roseta-Palma and Xepapadeas, 2004). Meanwhile, decision makers are influenced by a wave of thought, loosely organized under the heading of the “precautionary principle,” urging less aggressive action, or the delay of irreversible actions, under conditions of risk or Knightian uncertainty. This mode of thinking is provided some qualified economic support by the literature on option value (Arrow and Fisher, 1974; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Gollier, 2003), but is countered by the literature on adaptive management (e.g., Walters, 1986), which urges active learning in the presence of risk and uncertainty. Given these divergent approaches, and their often conflicting advice, it is of little surprise that resource governance continues to struggle with how to incorporate risk and uncertainty into decision making.

Lost in the focus on the positive implications of risk and uncertainty for resource management is the question of how risk and uncertainty influence the *valuation* of natural capital. This is a distinct concern from pricing risk (or risk reduction) itself, as in the literature on quasi-option value or the value of information (Hanemann, 1989). Rather than pricing increments of risk, we are asking, how does the introduction of risk, or change in the magnitude of risk, alter the value attached to changes in the stocks of biotic or abiotic resources? In what circumstances might risk act to devalue capital stocks, and when might risk enhance a stock’s value? How do the presence of non-linear dynamics and the presence of alternative stable states (Dasgupta and Mäler, 2004) alter the valuation of risk?

Addressing these questions is important for the prospective valuation of policy changes

28 that alter resource stocks as well as for retrospective valuation of changes in these stocks,
29 as in natural resource damage assessment. Valuation of natural capital is also critical for
30 development of wealth-based indicators of sustainability (e.g., Dasgupta, 2001; Dasgupta
31 and Mäler, 2000; Hamilton and Clemens, 1999) that have become increasingly common at
32 the level of international and national assessments (UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2014; Dasgupta,
33 2021)¹ and that have been used to assess the sustainability of bounded systems such as cities
34 (Dovern, Quaas, and Rickels, 2014), hydrological catchments (Pearson et al., 2013) and as an
35 indicator of sustainable management for ecosystems (Yun et al., 2017). Nevertheless, despite
36 the importance of understanding the effects of risk on the valuation of natural capital, little
37 research on this topic exists, at least within the natural resource economics literature.²

38 To understand the effects of risk on the valuation of natural capital, we must first situate
39 risk within the theory of capital valuation (Jorgenson, 1963). Valuing biotic and abiotic
40 resources as capital requires that they are valued in terms of the discounted present value
41 of the service flows that derive from their consumptive or non-consumptive use – usually in
42 combination with human and reproducible capital. Therefore, it is imperative that changes
43 in natural capital stocks be mapped to changes in the trajectory of capital stocks and any as-
44 sociated service flows (Fenichel, Abbott, and Yun, 2018). In other words, valuation of natural
45 capital must implicitly or explicitly be dependent on a *forecast* of the value of the service flows
46 from capital stocks as well as their stocks themselves, where fully coupled human-natural
47 systems models (e.g., bioeconomic models) provide one such forecast (Fenichel, Abbott, and
48 Yun, 2018). An essential aspect of these forecasts is a description of how human behavior
49 that influences service flows or the trajectory of capital stocks will change in response to the
50 stocks of capital and other time-varying states of the system. Just as any financial analyst’s

¹For example, Canada contracted for a Comprehensive Wealth report in 2018 <https://www.iisd.org/library/comprehensive-wealth-canada-2018-measuring-what-matters-long-term> and the U.K. has developed a 25 year plan focused on natural capital, <https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/natural-capital-committee>.

²Kvamsdal et al. (2020) offer an analysis of “ocean wealth” in the Barents sea for a three-species ecosystem that includes stochasticity. However, the role of risk is ancillary to the multi-species focus of the analysis.

51 valuation of a company is contingent on their (often implicit) beliefs of how the company’s
52 management will leverage a company’s capital stocks to provide valuable goods and services
53 and then invest in these capital stocks moving forward, so any valuation of natural capital
54 is contingent upon beliefs about the feedback control rule (i.e. the “economic program”)
55 linking capital stocks to the human behavior that “manages” the system. This includes
56 expectations about how the manager will respond to risk and uncertainty. Yet, focus within
57 bioeconomics has often centered upon the special case of control rules that optimize the
58 present value of the system. While understandable from the perspective of advising policy,
59 the fixation on optimal control rules fails to provide a realistic forecast of human interactions
60 with natural systems in many cases. Given that many natural capital stocks provide service
61 flows that are non-excludable, non-rivalrous, and are themselves often subject to incomplete
62 property rights, collective action dilemmas, and other governance failures, it is not surprising
63 that their management is often demonstrably inefficient, even ‘kakatopic’ (Dasgupta, 2001).
64 Therefore, bioeconomic models that utilize optimality assumptions may provide a poor fore-
65 cast of the management of natural capital stocks, thereby yielding questionable valuations
66 of natural capital - valuations that are critical for credible sustainability assessments.

67 Fortunately, substantial theoretical, and some empirical, progress has been made in recent
68 years in capital-theoretic valuation of natural resources in non-optimized settings. Drawing
69 upon earlier work (e.g., Dasgupta and Mäler, 2000; Arrow et al., 2012), Fenichel and Abbott
70 (2014) provide a theoretical foundation for pricing of natural assets by deriving the revealed
71 shadow price or accounting price of natural capital under general, non-optimized forms
72 of management, and link their derivation to foundational contributions in economic capital
73 theory (Jorgenson, 1963).³ In this and subsequent work with coauthors, they demonstrate the

³See Fenichel, Abbott, and Yun (2018) for a detailed development of natural capital pricing. This approach has subsequently been expanded to allow for the valuation of a portfolio of capital stocks whose dynamics may be interlinked through physical or biological processes or via human behavior (Yun et al., 2017). These methods have been used to value a range of natural capital stocks, from fish in single-species fisheries (Fenichel and Abbott, 2014), groundwater (Fenichel et al., 2016; Addicott and Fenichel, 2019), coastal habitat (Bond, 2017), an assemblage of interacting fish stocks (Yun et al., 2017), threatened species in an ecosystem context (Maher et al., 2020).

74 necessary components of an accounting price for natural assets and develop and implement
75 computational approaches to measure accounting prices. However, risk and uncertainty are
76 notably absent from the theory and empirical work springing from this literature. This
77 omission limits the ability to answer the question at the core of this paper – how does risk
78 alter the valuation of natural capital when it is valued according to the principles of capital
79 theory?

80 We make progress on this research question by, first, expanding the theory of natural
81 capital valuation to embrace stochasticity. The resulting equations provide intuition into
82 the ways that risk can influence the *total* value provided by one or more capital stocks
83 and *marginal* valuation – the “shadow price.” We also expand upon the computational
84 approaches utilized in prior work to show how these valuations can be uncovered in the
85 context of coupled bioeconomic models. Second, we deploy these approaches using simple
86 examples from natural resource management, using optimized and non-optimized control
87 rules to examine the qualitative and quantitative effects of risk on natural capital valuation.
88 Intriguingly, we find that under a range of specifications and reasonable risk levels the effect of
89 stochasticity on valuation is minimal – so minimal as to suggest risk can be safely ignored for
90 valuation in similar applications. One commonality of these examples, however, is convexity,
91 with a single stochastic steady state. Therefore, as our third contribution, we consider the
92 implications of introducing stochasticity to systems with non-convexities and multiple stable
93 states by examining total and marginal valuations for a canonical non-convex ecosystem
94 – a renewable resource with a minimum viable population – under stochasticity. We find
95 that non-convexity interacts with stochasticity in complex ways – potentially reversing the
96 finding that risk “doesn’t matter” for valuation while also showing that the effects of risk
97 on marginal valuation of natural capital are highly contingent on the stock level relative to
98 critical threshold locations in the state space. In short, risk can depreciate investments in
99 natural capital at some stock levels and raise the value of investments at others.

100 The organization of the paper is as follows. The following section derives the shadow

101 price formulas for the single- and multi-stock cases. Section 3 demonstrates the valuation
102 approach for a canonical, single-stock, stochastic control problem where the optimal co-state
103 (i.e. accounting price) is available in closed form. This allows us to validate our approach
104 and also allows us to isolate the effects of stochasticity from the effects of the choice of
105 a sub-optimal control rule (economic programs) that may stem from heuristics for coping
106 with stochasticity. Section 4 extends our approach to a stochastic version of the Gulf of
107 Mexico reef fish case study examined in Fenichel and Abbott (2014). This case allows us
108 to consider the impact of natural stochasticity in a real-world, non-optimal setting under
109 conditions of convexity. Section 5 extends our analysis to non-convex settings, using the
110 case of a harvested resource with a minimum viable population as an example. Section 6
111 concludes the paper.

112 2. Theory

113 2.1. Derivation of shadow pricing formula

114 Let $s(t)$ represent the known stock of a scalar asset at time t .⁴ Suppose the dynamics
115 of s are represented by a diffusion or Ito process with stationary infinitesimal parameters
116 $\mu(s, x(s))$ and $\sigma(s)$. The diffusion process is written as

$$ds(t) = \mu(s(t), x(s(t))) dt + \sigma(s(t))dZ(t) \quad (1)$$

117 where $dZ(t)$ is an increment of a Wiener process (Stokey, 2009). The drift of the diffusion
118 $\mu(s, x(s))$ is specified as a function of the current capital stock and as a function of the
119 feedback control rule, known as the economic program or resource allocation mechanism,
120 $x(s)$. Once the substitution for the economic program has been made, the drift is an explicit
121 function of only s .

122 Let $W(s, x)$ be an instantaneous measure of welfare. Importantly, the concavity prop-

⁴ t is suppressed when doing so does not cause confusion.

123 erties of this function are quite general, allowing for the full range of risk preferences in
 124 “consumption” (x) and the resource stock. Define the intertemporal welfare function, eval-
 125 uated along the economic program and along the stochastic capital trajectory given by (1),
 126 as

$$V(s(t)) = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\int_t^\infty e^{-\delta(\tau-t)} W(s(\tau), x(s(\tau))) d\tau \right] \quad (2)$$

127 where \mathbb{E}_t is the expectations operator. The marginal value of an investment in the capital
 128 stock in expectation is defined as $p(s) \equiv V_s$. To derive the properties of $p(s)$, start by
 129 differentiating (2) with respect to t .

$$\frac{dV}{dt} = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\delta \int_t^\infty e^{-\delta(\tau-t)} W(\cdot) d\tau - W(s(t), x(s(t))) \right] = \delta V - W(s(t), x(s(t))) \quad (3)$$

130 The first equality in (3) assumes that the derivative can be carried through the expectation
 131 operator, which is ensured by the stationarity of the infinitesimal parameters of (1). The
 132 second equality holds because the state of the system is known at $\tau = t$.

We know that $\frac{dV}{dt} = \frac{\mathbb{E}_t[dV]}{dt}$. By Ito’s Lemma

$$dV = \left[\mu(s) V_s + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2(s) V_{ss} \right] dt + \sigma(s) V_s dZ$$

Taking the expected value, and employing the property that all stochastic integrals are
 identically zero (Stokey, 2009):

$$\mathbb{E}_t[dV] = \left[\mu(s) V_s + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2(s) V_{ss} \right] dt$$

133 so that

$$\frac{dV}{dt} = \frac{\mathbb{E}_t[dV]}{dt} = \mu(s) V_s + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2(s) V_{ss} \quad (4)$$

134 Setting (3) equal to (4) we obtain the stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:

$$\delta V(s) = W(s(t), x(s(t))) + \mu(s) V_s + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2(s) V_{ss} \quad (5)$$

136 Substitute $p(s) \equiv V_s$ into the HJB equation yielding:

$$\delta V(s) = W(s(t), x(s(t))) + p(s) \mu(s) + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2(s) p_s(s) \quad (6)$$

137 The first two terms on the RHS are the traditional deterministic current-value Hamilto-
 138 nian. The third term captures the effect of risk even if the deterministic rate of change in
 139 the capital stock $\mu(s) = 0$. The risk effect captures the effect of Jensen's inequality via the
 140 curvature of the intertemporal welfare function. If the shadow price function is downward
 141 sloping then $p_s < 0$ so that risk has a negative effect on the intertemporal welfare function.

142 Importantly, the derivatives V_s and V_{ss} in (5) (i.e. p and p_s in (6)) are evaluated after
 143 substitution of a particular feedback control rule $x(s)$, which in general need not optimize the
 144 HJB. The implication is that the slope, curvature, and higher derivatives of the intertemporal
 145 welfare function reflect, in part, the properties of this economic program. The one exception
 146 to this case is when the economic program is dynamically optimal. In this case the properties
 147 of the economic program play no role in the shape of the intertemporal welfare function.⁵

148 Suppressing functional dependency on s , and differentiating (6) with respect to s yields:

$$\delta p = W_s + \mu_s p + \mu p_s + \sigma \sigma_s p_s + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 p_{ss}$$

149 Isolating p on the left-hand side we obtain the asset pricing equation:

$$p(s) = \frac{W_s + [\mu(s) + \sigma(s)\sigma_s(s)]p_s + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2(s)p_{ss}}{\delta - \mu_s(s)} \quad (7)$$

150 A parallel derivation of this pricing equation for the multi-stock case is provided in

⁵See Section 2.3 for the mathematical and economic justification of this assertion.

151 [Appendix A](#).

152 *2.2. Intuition*

In the case where the variance of the noise in (1) does not depend on s then (7) reduces to:

$$p(s) = \frac{W_s + \mu(s)p_s + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 p_{ss}}{\delta - \mu_s(s)}$$

and if capital dynamics are deterministic or $p_{ss} = 0$ then this further reduces to

$$p(s) = \frac{W_s + \mu(s)p_s}{\delta - \mu_s(s)}$$

153 which is the same as in [Fenichel and Abbott \(2014\)](#), who show that this equation is equivalent
 154 to [Jorgenson \(1963\)](#). The general asset pricing equation equation (7) contains two additional
 155 numerator terms relative to Fenichel and Abbott’s deterministic derivation. The first term
 156 enters in a way that is symmetric to capital gains in a deterministic system and depends on
 157 the extent of “risk aversion” embodied in the curvature of the intertemporal welfare function
 158 (since $p_s \equiv V_{ss}$) and the extent to which the standard deviation of the diffusion is elastic with
 159 respect to s . If increasing investment in s increases the size of shocks, and if the shadow price
 160 function is decreasing in the stock (analogous to risk aversion), then this results in a “capital
 161 loss.” This term only matters if the variance depends on the capital stock, as in the case of
 162 geometric Brownian motion. Importantly, curvature of the intertemporal welfare function,
 163 which is defined over the domain of the capital stock only, need not result from underlying
 164 curvature of the “social utility” or real income function for welfare flows $W(\cdot)$. Indeed, the
 165 nature of risk preferences over flows embodied in W (including risk neutrality) may have no
 166 direct mapping to the curvature of $V(s)$. Curvature of the intertemporal welfare function
 167 can also be inherited from the underlying biophysical dynamics in (1) or from non-optimal
 168 economic programs $x(s)$ – suggesting that the risk premia embodied in the numerator of
 169 (7) are endogenous to policy and may reflect actual existing levels of self-insurance and self-
 170 protection ([Ehrlich and Becker, 1972](#)). This first term pertains to how a marginal investment

171 in the capital stock increases risk, holding the curvature of the intertemporal welfare function
172 constant.

173 The second additional term in (7) is present with stochastic dynamics so long as the
174 third derivative of the intertemporal welfare (or value) function is non-zero. There will be a
175 premium if there is a positive third derivative (convex price function), while a negative third
176 derivative (concave price function) yields a discount. If the value function is quadratic (i.e.
177 zero derivatives above the second derivative), then this term is zero. Both additional terms
178 in the numerator of (7) originate from differentiating $\frac{1}{2}\sigma^2(s)p_s$ term in (6). This second term
179 can be interpreted as the affect of a marginal increase in the capital stock on risk aversion,
180 holding risk constant or interpreted as “prudence,” which is associated with precautionary
181 savings (Kimball, 1990). If risk aversion is increased by the investment ($V_{sss} = p_{ss} < 0$)
182 then the shadow price is decreased. In other words, the pricing of risk into the capital asset
183 depends on how additional investment affects the sensitivity to risk, given the biophysical
184 dynamics and economic program in place, in addition to how the marginal investment affects
185 the risk itself. The former effect can be thought of as a “self insurance effect” because changes
186 in the curvature of the intertemporal welfare function impact the consequences of stochastic
187 events rather than their probability (Shogren and Crocker, 1999).

188 Importantly, (7) tells us that risk will have no *marginal* effect on the valuation of natural
189 capital when two conditions hold: 1) the volatility of risk is not a function of the capital
190 stock (i.e. risk is “exogenous”); and 2) the shadow price function is linear ($p_{ss} = 0$), so that
191 the intertemporal welfare function is quadratic. This coincides with well-known results in
192 economic theory that optimizing agents facing exogenous shocks to their income will not
193 alter their saving behavior in the presence of a mean preserving spread in risk if they have
194 quadratic utility in consumption. In this case (7) collapses to the co-state equation for the
195 deterministic case, so that optimal behavior is invariant to risk.⁶

⁶The fact that these results are specified in terms of the third derivatives of the instantaneous utility function (in consumption) rather than the intertemporal welfare function (in unit of savings or capital) is because the linear properties of the growth function of capital in the simple savings problem, combined

196 *2.3. Optimized vs. non-optimized asset pricing*

197 In this section we demonstrate how non-optimal economic programs alter the marginal
 198 valuation of capital stocks, relative to the co-state evaluated along the optimal program. Let
 199 the non-optimal program for a given setup be $x(s)$, while the optimized program is $x^*(s)$. The
 200 intertemporal welfare function along the non-optimal economic program is $V(s, x(s)) = V(s)$.
 201 The shadow price can therefore be written as:

$$V_s = \frac{dV}{ds} = \frac{\partial V}{\partial s} + \frac{\partial V}{\partial x} \frac{dx}{ds} \quad (8)$$

202 By the maximum principle and as a consequence of the envelope theorem $\frac{\partial V}{\partial x} = 0$ when
 203 $x(s) = x^*(s) \forall s$. In this case (9) collapses to $V_s = \frac{dV}{ds} = \frac{\partial V}{\partial s}$. This suggests that the shadow
 204 price can be cleanly broken into two terms: 1) the partial derivative of the value function
 205 w.r.t. s , which is present in the optimized case; and 2) a component that is only present
 206 in non-optimized cases, and that therefore reflects a “non-optimality bias” of sorts. This is
 207 *almost* correct but neglects to account for the fact that $\frac{\partial V}{\partial s}$ is evaluated at the non-optimized
 208 value of x for a given s , whereas it is evaluated at the optimal x in the optimized case.

209 To account for this, add zero in the form of $\frac{\partial V(s, x^*(s))}{\partial s} - \frac{\partial V(s, x^*(s))}{\partial s} = \frac{\partial V^*(s)}{\partial s} - \frac{\partial V^*(s)}{\partial s}$ to (9)

$$V_s = \frac{\partial V^*(s)}{\partial s} + \left(\frac{\partial V}{\partial s} - \frac{\partial V^*(s)}{\partial s} \right) + \frac{\partial V}{\partial x} \frac{dx}{ds} \quad (9)$$

210 This equation tells us that we can write the shadow price as the optimal shadow price
 211 (which is, by definition, evaluated at the optimal value of the economic program) plus a first
 212 “distortion term” that is the gap in the partial derivative of the value function that arises
 213 solely through the gap between $x(s)$ and $x^*(s)$ plus a final distortion term that is a function of
 214 the sensitivity of the non-optimized intertemporal welfare function to the economic program
 215 $\frac{\partial V}{\partial x}$ and the slope of the non-optimized economic program itself.

with the selection of the *optimal* investment rule ensure that the shape properties of the utility function are reflected in the intertemporal welfare (value) function as well. This mapping does not carry over to the case of non-optimized control rules with non-linear drift terms, as in the case of most natural capital.

216 The first distortion arises only because the partial derivative of V is being evaluated at a
 217 level of x that does not set marginal benefits equal to marginal costs inclusive of the shadow
 218 price at a given s . If the optimal and non-optimal economic program coincide at a particular
 219 s then this term vanishes. For example, suppose that the optimized and non-optimized
 220 economic programs both achieve the same steady state so that $x(s_{SS}) = x^*(s_{SS})$, then this
 221 term would vanish at the steady state stock. In general, if $V_{sx} = 0$ then this distortion term
 222 is zero.

223 The second distortion term arises because of the slope of the non-optimal economic
 224 program, rather than its level. Note that the more non-optimal the economic program is –
 225 the larger $\frac{\partial V}{\partial x}$ is – the larger this will be. Also, the more responsive the economic program
 226 is to the state – the larger $\frac{dx}{ds}$ is in absolute terms – the larger this distortion will be. We
 227 may also be able to sign the distortion. If, at the non-optimal level of $x(s)$, it would improve
 228 intertemporal welfare to harvest less instantaneously and the economic program is upward
 229 sloping, then we know that the distortion is negative, causing sub-optimal management to
 230 lead to an undervaluation of the stock.

231 3. An optimized single-stock example

232 The asset pricing equation presented in the previous section is valid regardless of whether
 233 the economic program maximizes intertemporal welfare or not. Still, it is useful to build
 234 intuition for the role of risk in shadow prices from an optimized model. Simple optimized
 235 models may also confer the benefit of a closed form solution for the co-state, thereby allowing
 236 for a direct validation of the numerical approximation approach.⁷

237 To provide this example, we draw upon a case developed in [Pindyck \(1984\)](#). In this sem-
 238 inal contribution, Pindyck extends the canonical infinite horizon, continuous-time renewable
 239 resource model for a single stock to allow for a stochastically evolving resource stock. The

⁷[Fenichel and Abbott \(2014\)](#) follow a similar process in the deterministic case by evaluating how the natural asset pricing approach works on a simulated optimal program.

240 focus of the modeling is on revealing how the ‘golden rule’ of resource management is aug-
 241 mented by a risk premium term. Pindyck then explores how the biological and economic
 242 parameterization interacts with increases in risk to influence the optimal extraction rate and
 243 the stochastic steady state distribution.

244 Our model draws directly on Pindyck’s example 1 (p. 296), which is also explored in
 245 Miranda and Fackler (2004, p. 330). Pindyck’s objective is to maximize the expected net
 246 present value of the combined consumer and producer surplus from harvest q of the fish
 247 stock s over an infinite horizon, where the demand function is isoelastic, $q(p) = bp^{-\eta}$, and
 248 the marginal cost of harvest is $cs^{-\gamma}$.⁸ Therefore, the social planner is risk-neutral in their
 249 assessment of flows of monetized instantaneous social welfare. Note, however, that these
 250 assumptions nevertheless imply that the instantaneous welfare function is strictly concave in
 251 harvest, implying aversion to any risk-induced fluctuations in harvest levels. The resource dy-
 252 namics evolve according to a diffusion characterized by a logistic drift function with stochas-
 253 ticity that follows a geometric Brownian motion process: $ds = [rs(1 - s/K) - q] dt + \sigma s dZ$.

254 In general, this model must be solved numerically. However, Pindyck (1984) demonstrates
 255 that a closed form solution to the HJB equation exists when $\eta = 1/2$ and $\gamma = 2$. Specifically,
 256 the optimized co-state (or rent) is:

$$V_s = \phi/s^2 \tag{10}$$

257 and the optimized economic program (feedback control rule) is:

$$x(s) = q^*(s) = \frac{b}{(\phi + c)^{1/2}} s \tag{11}$$

258 where

$$\phi = \frac{2b^2 + 2b[b^2 + c(r + \delta - \sigma^2)^2]^{1/2}}{(r + \delta - \sigma^2)^2} \tag{12}$$

⁸Pindyck uses x for the state variable, we have changed this to s to avoid confusion and align with notation within this paper.




Figure 1: Illustration the the natural capital asset pricing approximation approach reproduces known value function and price curves for a stochastic system.

259 The resulting economic program (11) increases linearly in the stock. Such rules imply a
 260 constant (per-capita) rate of fishing mortality – what the fisheries literature calls a “constant-
 261 F” rule. This is a common harvest rule in natural resource management (Deroba and Bence,
 262 2008). Importantly, $\partial\phi/\partial\sigma^2 > 0$. This implies that $\partial x/\partial\sigma^2 = \partial q^*/\partial\sigma^2 < 0$ and $\partial V_s/\partial\sigma^2 > 0$,
 263 meaning that increasing stochasticity in this model always increases the accounting price of
 264 the stock, thereby *decreasing* the optimal rate of harvest at every stock level.⁹

265 We approximate the value function using an extension of the basis function approximation
 266 approach employed in Yun et al. (2017) as detailed in Appendix B.¹⁰ Figure 1 shows that
 267 we are able to reproduce the analytical value function and shadow price to a high degree of
 268 accuracy.

269 Dynamic optimization in this example yields an economic program that reflects what we
 270 might term “uniform precaution” (Figure 2, black line). Increases in stochasticity lead to

⁹The partial derivative of the economic program with respect to σ^2 is a comparative static – the volatility parameter is constant. This means that in a sense the risk profile is not changing over time or the system is not becoming more or less risky.

¹⁰We use parameter values of $\sigma = 0.1$, $\delta = 0.05$, $b = 1$, $r = 0.5$, and $K = 1$.

271 a less aggressive harvest rate at *all* stock levels and therefore a larger ‘target’ steady state
272 biomass. Pindyck shows that stock stochasticity has three competing effects in an optimized
273 stochastic problem that may lead to more or less aggressive (less or more precautionary)
274 harvest relative to the deterministic case. The first, a variance reduction effect, encourages
275 the manager to hold a smaller stock due to the fact that the variance of stock increases in
276 the stock size, and variance lowers the value function, which follows from the concavity of
277 value function. This effect works through the first risk-specific numerator term in (7). The
278 second, a cost reduction effect, encourages the manager to hold a smaller stock as variance
279 increases due to the cost-increasing effects of stochastic fluctuations on expected harvest costs
280 because of the concavity of the harvest cost function – an implication of Jensen’s inequality.
281 Third, a growth rate effect encourages managers to hold *more* stock as variance rises because
282 stochasticity reduces the expected growth rate of the stock, which follows from the concavity
283 of the growth function. Both the cost reduction and growth rate effects operate through the
284 second risk-specific numerator term in (7). Pindyck shows through a series of examples how
285 the different effects can lead to more or less aggressive harvest, and hence higher or lower
286 valuations, relative to the deterministic case, under risk. Of particular importance are the
287 elasticity of demand and the skewness of the growth function.

288 In practice, managers may choose to exercise more (or less) precaution than the level
289 that maximizes Pindyck’s object. We reflect these adjustments through two scalar shifts of
290 the economic program, where harvests are either systematically lower (purple line, half the
291 optimal harvest at every point) or greater (red line, 1.5 times the optimal harvest at every
292 point) than the optimizing program (black line) (Figure 2). These shifts lead to economic
293 programs that are non-optimal everywhere and result in different stochastic equilibria. These
294 deviations from optimality are reflected in the intertemporal welfare functions and accounting
295 price functions.

296 We also consider an economic program that deviates from the “constant-F” form (Figure
297 2, blue curve) by being a convex function of the stock. This program is ‘adaptive’ in its




Figure 2: Stock-catch space showing the optimal harvest feedback rule and three alternative non-optimal economic programs

298 degree of precaution by being more conservative at low stocks and more aggressive at high
 299 stocks.¹¹ For the sake of comparison, we calibrate this control rule to have the same stochastic
 300 equilibrium as the optimal program. Therefore, the adaptive program is the optimal program
 301 if, and only if, the stock is at the stochastic equilibrium. The strong convexity of the
 302 adaptive program reflects an important feature of real natural resource management systems
 303 – managerial bias for system stability. In this case, the steady state probability distribution
 304 will have a lower variance than the optimal program. The shape of this control rule, but not
 305 its anchoring on the optimal steady state, is similar to the feedback process that [Zhang and](#)
 306 [Smith \(2011\)](#) estimate and [Fenichel and Abbott \(2014\)](#) use in their application to the Gulf
 307 of Mexico reef fish fishery.

308 Figure 3 compares the intertemporal welfare and price functions for the scalar trans-

¹¹In fisheries management, this adaptivity is often accomplished in practice by distinct linear harvest control rules that are each applicable within different stock thresholds—in essence a linear spline function.

309 formations of the optimal harvest program for the stochastic ($\sigma = 0.1$, solid lines) and
310 deterministic case ($\sigma = 0$, dotted lines). Importantly, the optimal and sub-optimal economic
311 programs adjust for the value of σ according to the feedback rule in (11). The left-hand panel,
312 showing the intertemporal welfare functions, shows that risk strictly reduces welfare. Risk
313 has a similar effect across all three economic programs. Stochasticity appears to translate
314 the intertemporal welfare functions down in a nearly constant manner (i.e. a location shift).
315 This suggests that *changes* in welfare between stock levels – which are the relevant metrics
316 for social benefit cost analysis and sustainability assessment – may be minimally affected
317 by volatile stock dynamics. The first column of Table 1 considers the welfare change for a
318 relatively large perturbation in stock from 0.37 to 0.57. Regardless of whether we consider
319 the optimal or sub-optimal programs, we find that the change in welfare from a stock shift is
320 3 percent greater in the stochastic case relative to the deterministic case, despite substantial
321 volatility. Therefore, ignoring stochasticity may systematically undervalue changes in nat-
322 ural capital. However, our example indicates that this bias may be small in some cases.¹²
323 Indeed, we find that the changes in measured welfare across the three economic programs –
324 holding stochasticity constant – are much more sizable than the effects of ignoring stochastic-
325 ity. This suggests that the *behavioral or managerial responses* to stochasticity (i.e., excessive
326 or inadequate precaution that push the system toward a sub-optimal equilibrium) may be
327 more consequential for welfare than the effects of stochasticity itself.

328 Given the apparently near-vertical translations of the intertemporal welfare functions
329 from introducing stochasticity, it is unsurprising that risk has a muted effect on the accounting
330 price functions (Figure 3). This is a direct effect of the price being the first derivative of the
331 value function. The effect of stochasticity on the shadow price is hardly noticeable. For the
332 optimal program and its scalar multiples, price always increases in stochasticity. However,

¹²We find that employing the program associated with deterministic dynamics to a system with stochastic dynamics has a small effect. Using the “wrong” program can either lead to a larger or small assessment of the welfare change, relative to using the stochastic program. This is due to second-best nature of these feedback rules.




Figure 3: The intertemporal welfare (value) function and shadow price curves for optimal program and two scalar shifts of the optimal program with stochastic and deterministic dynamics.

333 stochasticity has only a second-order effect on marginal values – hardly surprising given the
 334 small welfare effects of stochasticity for non-marginal stock changes (which integrate under
 335 the price curve) noted in the previous paragraph. ¹³

336 Now consider the adaptive economic program (Figure 4), which mimics the asymmetric
 337 precaution observed in the management of many harvested resource systems. This added
 338 precaution ensures a greater degree of stability relative to linear feedback rules.¹⁴ Import-
 339 tantly, this rule has the same steady state as the optimal control rule, so all differences are
 340 due to the sub-optimal approach path and its potential interactions with stochasticity. As
 341 before, the most apparent effect of introducing stochasticity to the adaptive economic pro-
 342 gram is a downward shift in the intertemporal welfare function. However, there are subtle,
 343 but important differences relative to the optimal (linear) control rule case.

344 In the deterministic case (dashed curves), the intertemporal welfare value in the region

¹³Stochasticity has no effect on the approximation error of welfare changes introduced by using a price index over the change multiplied by the change in quantity (Table 1). The use of price indexes is likely necessary in applied wealth accounting approaches for sustainability assessment. The Fisher Ideal price Index is the geometric mean of prices. The Mean price Index is the arithmetic mean of prices.

¹⁴This may suggest managerial risk aversion or unobserved adjustment costs.

Table 1: Comparison of the change in welfare and the change in wealth using two different index number approaches. The Fisher Ideal index is the geometric mean of prices, and the Mean price index is the arithmetic mean of prices. The price index is multiplied by the change in quantity.

Program	Change in Welfare	Fisher Ideal Index	%error	Mean Price Index	%error
Optimal rule with deterministic dynamics	15.920	15.920	0.000	17.373	0.091
Optimal rule with stochastic dynamics	16.405	16.405	0.000	17.902	0.091
Adaptive rule with deterministic dynamics	17.110	16.901	-0.012	18.873	0.103
Adaptive rule with stochastic dynamics	17.730	17.517	-0.012	19.553	0.103
Scalar rule, 0.5 of the optimum, with deterministic dynamics	20.855	20.855	0.000	22.758	0.091
Scalar rule, 0.5 of the optimum, with stochastic dynamics	21.497	21.497	0.000	23.459	0.091
Scalar rule, 1.5 of the optimum, with deterministic dynamics	19.081	19.081	0.000	20.822	0.091
Scalar rule, 1.5 of the optimum, with stochastic dynamics	19.692	19.692	0.000	21.489	0.091

345 of the equilibrium is approximately the same under the adaptive and optimal programs
346 (indeed, identical at the equilibrium itself). Therefore, small changes in the stock in this
347 region result in near-identical welfare changes under either program. It is only as the system
348 moves significantly from the equilibrium that there is a meaningful divergence between the
349 intertemporal welfare functions in a deterministic system. By contrast, when the system is
350 stochastic, the intertemporal welfare function under the adaptive program is always below
351 that of the optimal program – even at the stochastic steady state biomass. This occurs
352 because even at the equilibrium point there is an expectation of a shock that will move the
353 system to a region where the adaptive program is meaningfully sub-optimal.

354 These features are reflected in the shadow price curves (Figure 4, right panel). The




Figure 4: The intertemporal welfare (value) function and shadow price curves for the optimal program and a non-optimal adaptive “precautionary” economic program that preserves the stochastic equilibrium under stochastic and deterministic dynamics.

355 shadow price curves cross at the equilibrium. This must be the case in the deterministic
 356 model for the adaptive program to be sub-optimal everywhere except at the equilibrium;
 357 it is required for the intertemporal welfare function of the adaptive program to “bow in”
 358 relative to the optimal program’s value function. This feature is inherited in the stochastic
 359 setting as well.

360 Despite these subtleties, the shadow price curves for the deterministic and stochastic
 361 dynamics for the adaptive precautionary economic program remain remarkably similar (2.7
 362 % mean absolute error). Once again, the first order effects for valuation derive from the
 363 choice of the economic program – not from the introduction of stochasticity.

364 The analysis of Pindyck’s model suggests that stochasticity may be, at most, a second-
 365 order concern for social benefit-cost analysis or sustainability assessment in some settings.¹⁵
 366 This appears in sharp contrast to much of the literature’s broader concern with stochasticity,

¹⁵Lest the reader think we are cherry-picking an extreme example to minimize stochasticity, Pindyck’s example 2 in the same paper replaces the logistic growth function with a Gompertz growth function to show that risk has *no* effect on shadow prices, and hence *no effect on changes in welfare*, in the optimal management case.

367 risk, and uncertainty. In the next section, we investigate a real-world system that that has
 368 similar features to the Pindyck model to see if these findings are robust to real-world, non-
 369 optimized management.

370 4. Gulf of Mexico (GOM) Reef Fish

371 The Gulf of Mexico reef fish example presented in [Fenichel and Abbott \(2014\)](#) has many
 372 of the same properties as the [Pindyck \(1984\)](#) model. [Zhang and Smith \(2011\)](#) estimated a
 373 logistic growth equation for the stock, and [Zhang \(2011\)](#) estimated an empirically-grounded
 374 feedback rule with similar properties as the adaptive rule illustrated in prior section – though
 375 Zhang’s rule is not calibrated to achieve the optimal equilibrium (Figure 5).

376 We extend this deterministic model to the stochastic case while maintaining all other
 377 calibrated values. As in Pindyck, we augment the logistic stock dynamics with an additive
 378 geometric Brownian motion (GBM) noise term. Geometric Brownian motion is consistent
 379 with the assumptions of log-normal disturbances frequently used in population dynamic
 380 modeling and fisheries stock assessment. Utilizing the assessed biomass data from the fishery
 381 we calibrate $\sigma = 0.067$; therefore the standard deviation from the deterministic drift given
 382 by the logistic growth equation with harvest is approximately 6.7 percent of the stock level.
 383 The stock dynamics are:

$$ds = \left(rs(t) \left(1 - \frac{s(t)}{K} \right) - h(x(s(t)), s(t)) \right) dt + \sigma s(t) dZ(t), \quad (13)$$

384 where the intrinsic growth rate $r = 0.3847$ and carrying capacity $K = 3.59 \times 10^8$. The
 385 economic program, the feedback relationship linking stock status (in pounds (lbs)) and effort
 386 (in crew-days) in the fishery, is provided by a power rule, $x(s) = ys^\gamma$, where $\gamma = 0.7882$ and
 387 $y = 0.157$. We assume that the valuation of income flows in the fishery is directly expressed
 388 in terms of monetary profits, with price-taking firms and costs that are linear in effort:
 389 $W = mh - cx$, with $m = \$2.70/\text{lb.}$, $c = \$153/\text{crew-day}$. Thus instantaneous welfare is
 390 “risk-neutral” in monetary flows. The production function for harvests is of a generalized





Figure 5: The growth function and economic program for the Gulf of Mexico model.

391 Schaefer form $h = qsx(s)^\alpha$, with $q = 3.17 \times 10^{-4}$ and $\alpha = 0.544$. $W(s)$ is a strictly *convex*
 392 function of the stock once the endogenous feedback from the stock level to harvest behavior
 393 $x(s)$ is incorporated, despite the linearity of harvests and costs for a fixed allocation of effort
 394 x . Abstracting from stochasticity, Figure 5 shows the dynamics of the system are similar to
 395 the Pindyck model with the adaptive control rule.


396 4.1. Stock Dynamics

397 Figure 6 illustrates stochastic simulations of stock paths originating from the steady
 398 state biomass and harvest under four levels of stochasticity. The level of noise introduced
 399 by stochasticity in the base case (Fig. 6a) is reminiscent of the noise seen in many ecological
 400 systems. While extinction is technically impossible in continuous time, using the current
 401 economic program and geometric Brownian motion, our numerical simulations nevertheless
 402 show that the number of paths that tend to a numerically zero level increase dramatically
 403 with increases in σ . Indeed, all paths reach numerical extinction within 20 periods when
 404 $\sigma = 1.0$. This suggests that levels of σ of 0.5 or 1.0 are likely inconsistent with the dynamics
 405 of most real-world species. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provide a similar example where they
 406 argue that volatility can only be so high given a reasonable probability of observing the stock
 407 at all.¹⁶


¹⁶We thank Martin Quaas for bring this to our attention.




(a) $\sigma = .067$



(b) $\sigma = .2$



(c) $\sigma = .5$



(d) $\sigma = 1$

Figure 6: Stochastic simulations of stock dynamics over a range of values for σ . Note that the values for $\sigma = 1$ exceed the range of the graph on a number of runs.




Figure 7: The intertemporal welfare or value function and shadow price or account price function of the Gulf of Mexico reef fish example with four different values of σ

408 *4.2. Value Function and Shadow Price*

409 Unsurprisingly, increasing levels of volatility reduce the intertemporal welfare shown by
 410 the graph of the value function (Figure 7). Following Eq. (6) and the Pindyck example,
 411 the value function in the stochastic case includes an additional risk term that serves, in
 412 part, to shift the value function downward with increasing stochasticity. In the current
 413 case, the value function is concave in s (i.e. the shadow price curve is downward-sloping)
 414 so that increasing σ reduces the expected net present value at any given stock level. This
 415 adjustment is small (% error for price curves to the deterministic is 0.1, 0.9, 1.6, and 4.6
 416 for each σ) for the empirically-justified, and objectively fairly large, level of stochasticity in
 417 our system ($\sigma = .067$) – suggesting that the economic program is fairly robust to the level
 418 of stochasticity in the system by maintaining stock levels in a relatively insensitive range of
 419 the profit function.

420 Higher-order effects on the shape of the value function with increases in σ exist, but are
 421 small. Changes in the shadow prices (i.e. the derivative of the value function) are hardly
 422 noticeable (Fig. 7, right panel) and suggest the volatility is creating a nearly vertical shift in

423 the value function. Thus, while risk devalues the stock in total (albeit mildly), stochasticity
424 has little appreciable effect on its *marginal* valuation. Lost in the small magnitude of these
425 changes is a potentially interesting insight; whereas in the Pindyck example, increasing risk
426 increases the marginal valuation of the stock, in this case risk *lowers* the shadow price.

427 Consider the value of a change from the observed equilibrium to the stock level supporting
428 maximum sustained yield or half of carrying capacity. The change in the value function
429 for the deterministic case is \$244 million, whereas in the stochastic case the value is \$243
430 million.¹⁷ As expected, given the aforementioned effect of risk on marginal valuations, use of
431 the deterministic system as a proxy for the stochastic system appears to overvalue the change
432 in welfare or wealth slightly. This differs from Pindyck's optimized example, where failure to
433 consider risk leads to a slight *undervaluation* of the value of stock changes. Whether under-
434 or overvaluation is more likely ultimately depends upon the bioeconomic parameters.

435 On the whole, the Gulf of Mexico case reinforces the intuition developed by the Pindyck
436 example in the context of a real world, well-calibrated system governed by non-optimized
437 control rules. Risk appears to be a decidedly second-order feature for achieving accurate
438 valuations of either marginal or non-marginal changes in natural capital stocks. We con-
439 jecture that a key feature of both the Pindyck model and the GOM example that support this
440 result is the existence of a single stochastic equilibrium. The next section develops a simple
441 counterexample to explore the implications of thresholds and alternative stable states on
442 natural capital valuation.

443 5. GOM Reef Fish with Minimum Viable Population

444 There is a substantial literature on multiple equilibria (reviewed by [Fenichel et al. \(2015\)](#)),
445 but this literature largely focuses on deterministic models to examine how the optimal pursuit
446 of alternative long-run equilibria depends on initial conditions. [Fenichel, Abbott, and Yun](#)

¹⁷Using the Fisher Ideal index the change in value for the deterministic and stochastic cases are both \$245 million and using a mean price index both are \$250 million. In both cases there are difference of less than \$1 million.

447 (2018) argue that the mathematical difficulties caused by multiple equilibria for valuation
 448 purposes – where the economic program is typically pre-determined, and the relevant basin(s)
 449 of attraction are therefore known – are lessened compared to optimally controlling a system
 450 in the presence of non-convexities. However, introducing stochasticity to such a system
 451 brings with it the possibility of the system probabilistically entering or leaving one basin of
 452 attraction for another at a rate that is endogenous to the place in state space. The qualitative
 453 and quantitative effects on the value of the capital stock are potentially complex and poorly
 454 understood. As a simple example, we extend the Gulf of Mexico reef fish example to consider
 455 a canonical example of non-convexity, a harvested system under critical depensation.

456 5.1. Stock Dynamics

457 Maintaining the same harvest and profit function as before, we now adopt the following
 458 cubic growth function:

$$ds = \left(rs(t) \left(\frac{s(t)}{K_1} - 1 \right) \left(1 - \frac{s(t)}{K} \right) - h(x(s(t)), s(t)) \right) dt + \sigma s(t) dZ(t), \quad (14)$$

459 where K is the same carrying capacity (3.59×10^8) as given in Equation (13) and K_1 is
 460 the minimum viable population (setting as 10 % of K). This value is set for illustrative
 461 purposes, and is not based on data. Figure (8) shows the growth function and economic
 462 program in panel (a) and the trajectories of stock, given different initial conditions, in panel
 463 (b) under deterministic conditions. Note that there are now three bioeconomic equilibria:
 464 one stable equilibrium at extinction, a stable steady state at about 295 million pounds, and
 465 an unstable steady state at about 65 million pounds. This unstable steady state – not the
 466 critical minimum viable population of K_1 – marks the boundary between the basins of
 467 attraction for the two stable equilibria.

468 5.2. Value Function and Price Approximation

469 Approximation of shadow prices using basis function approximation techniques (Ap-
 470 pendix B) for this non-convex case has proven highly unstable. Therefore, to approximate




Figure 8: The cubic growth function and economic program and phase diagram for the cubic GOM reef fish model

471 the value function, we employ a straightforward but computationally intensive forward sim-
 472 ulation method over a dense grid of 600 starting stock values to estimate the value function
 473 ¹⁸. For each value of stock, we first generate 100,000 stochastic stock dynamics according
 474 to (14) using 800 time steps over 0.1 year intervals. We then calculate the numerical sum
 475 of the present value of profit for each trajectory, which is the Riemann sum to numerically
 476 approximate an integration with a midpoint rule. We then average over these 100,000 sim-
 477 ulated value functions to obtain the expected value function shown in the top of Figure (9)
 478 for the deterministic case and three different levels of volatility.

479 To derive the shadow price functions, we fit a flexible approximation to the dense grid of
 480 value function simulations and then differentiate this approximation. Specifically, we first use
 481 the cubic spline to approximate the value function at the 500 Chebyshev polynomial nodes
 482 using the simulated values from the brute force approximation. Then, we approximate the

¹⁸A similar approach was suggested by (Hamilton and Ruta, 2009)

483 value function using an 80th order Chebyshev polynomial approximation. Exploiting the an-
484 alytical differentiability of Chebyshev approximations, we use this functional approximation
485 to approximate the shadow price function as shown in the bottom of Figure 9.¹⁹

486 The forward simulation approach is extremely robust in its ability to recover the expected
487 intertemporal welfare function at any point in the approximation domain in the presence of
488 strong non-linearities and stochasticity – subject only to the simulation error associated with
489 the numerical simulation of stochastic differential equations and Monte Carlo integration,
490 though it is not elegant or efficient. In principle, basis function approximation methods
491 using collocation methods (i.e. where approximation nodes are equal to the number of basis
492 coefficients to recover) exactly satisfy the HJB equation at all approximation points and
493 utilize the flexibility of the semiparametric structure of the basis coefficients to interpolate
494 between these coefficients – in essence solving the forward simulation at any point in the
495 approximation domain without laborious simulations at every grid point (Fenichel, Abbott,
496 and Yun, 2018).²⁰ However, in practice we have found that basis function approximation
497 approaches, at least using Chebyshev polynomials, perform poorly at approximating the
498 highly non-linear shape of the intertemporal welfare function when levels, first, and second
499 derivatives are required. Approximations are particularly poor in the highly curved (and in
500 the deterministic case discontinuous) region around the unstable equilibrium. Furthermore,
501 attempts to improve the quality of approximation in this region through placement of nodes
502 or the use of additional basis functions often resulted in degeneration of the quality of the
503 approximation in the more distant portions of the approximation domain from the unstable
504 equilibrium.

505 It is possible that local, as opposed to global, approximation approaches (e.g., splines)
506 combined with careful placement of nodes may overcome these difficulties. However, any

¹⁹Appendix C provides a comparison of functional approximation using Chebyshev basis coefficients to the brute force approach.

²⁰Approximation using an overdetermined system (i.e. more nodes than coefficients) does not guarantee exact approximations at any point, but rather trades off approximation error at all points (Fenichel, Abbott, and Yun, 2018)


507 functional approximation method must ultimately grapple with the fact that the value func-
508 tion, lacking an analytical solution for such complex non-linear cases, is unknown – leaving
509 open the question of the quality of the approximation in the absence of a known true value.
510 Therefore, in order to provide robust estimates of asset values while establishing these “true”
511 values (subject to the bounds of simulation error), we utilize the forward simulation approach
512 in the following results. While laborious, advances in computing – particularly cost-effective
513 parallel processing – allow the forward simulation approach to be a reasonable alternative.

514 *5.3. Results*


515 Figure 9 shows the value function under varying degrees of risk. To understand the effect
516 of risk, it is useful to first understand the properties of the deterministic value function.
517 First, the value function is indeterminate at the unstable equilibrium biomass, reflecting two
518 potential trajectories in response to an infinitesimal shock. A “rightward” shock commits
519 the system to harvests along the economic program as the stock builds to the upper stable
520 equilibrium. The result is a concave and increasing value function in this basin of attraction,
521 which is reflected through a uniformly positive but downward sloping price curve. Con-
522 versely, a “leftward” shock commits the system to a an inevitable drawdown of the stock
523 to exhaustion.²¹ As a result, the value function in this basin of attraction is convex and
524 increasing in the stock. This is reflected through an increasing, albeit low, shadow price.
525 Furthermore, the value function experiences a dramatic decline to the left of the threshold
526 biomass, reflecting a truly catastrophic devaluation. This devaluation is also experienced at
527 the margin, with the marginal valuation of the stock as an investment plummeting once the
528 system is committed to the “drawdown” equilibrium.²²

²¹Note that the economic program at very low stock levels is perhaps unrealistic, forcing fishing at low levels even when profits are negative (as in a heavily subsidized fleet) so that the value function actually becomes negative, even though this is difficult to perceive from the figure.

²²While the context of this example is not one of optimization (the economic program is pre-determined), it is nevertheless clearly the case that if a social planner could pick a basin of attraction from the perspective of expected discounted profit maximization – in the sense of being pre-committed to the non-optimal economic program once landing in either basin – they would prefer the basin corresponding to the stable upper equilibrium to the extinction equilibrium. In other words, the value function is uniformly higher at all stock



(a) Value Function



(b) Shadow Price

Figure 9: Value function and shadow price of cubic growth GOM Reef Fish

529 Turning to the effects of risk, it is apparent that the addition of risk to this non-convex
530 system has qualitative and quantitative impacts on the valuation of natural capital – in total
531 and at the margin. Focusing on the intertemporal welfare function, the former discontinuity
532 at the unstable equilibrium biomass is replaced by value functions that assume the shape of
533 a logistic curve – with an inflection point at the unstable equilibrium. The steepness of the
534 central portion of the logistic curve declines as risk increases – acting to homogenize values
535 on either side of the threshold relative to the deterministic case. Intuitively, this effect arises
536 because in a small neighborhood on either side of the threshold biomass, GBM stochasticity
537 of the biomass acts symmetrically, either to throw the system into the “drawdown” basin
538 from the “sustainable fishing” basin or vice versa. The result is a smoothing of the value
539 function, where the extent of the smoothing increases in the level of stochasticity.

540 The effect of this risk-driven smoothing on the HJB equation is distinct depending upon
541 the basin of attraction. For values of stock above the threshold value, risk leads to a negative
542 risk adjustment term in the HJB equation (2.1), which is sensible given the concavity of the
543 value function in this region. However, the opposite occurs below the threshold biomass,
544 so that risk *increases* intertemporal welfare, given the concavity of the value function. In-
545 tuitively, the possibility of “good” shock to either rescue the fishery from the drawdown
546 basin or maintain system dynamics near the threshold leads to “risk loving” in valuation in
547 this region. Importantly, the risk premia/discounts to the HJB are at their largest in the
548 immediate vicinity of the threshold and deteriorate as stocks move away from the threshold
549 and the long-run value of the system is less influenced by the possibility of switching basins
550 of attraction. This zone of influence grows in the magnitude of risk, and it persists over
551 a wider range in the “sustainable fishing” basin due to the fact that the variance of GBM
552 shocks increases in stock size.

553 The effects on shadow prices mirror those for the intertemporal welfare function. Shadow
554 prices under risk are now roughly bell-shaped, with risk serving to homogenize marginal

levels above the unstable equilibrium relative to below it. This need not be the case in all settings.

555 valuations of investing in natural capital on either side of the threshold. Marginal valuations
556 consistently peak at the threshold biomass itself and decline in either direction, with the
557 rate of decline falling as stochasticity increases. Increasing levels of risk act to homogenize
558 marginal valuations over a wider range of values, as reflected in the increasingly linear
559 section of the value function in the region of the threshold. Each shadow price curve has
560 a concave region, centered around the threshold biomass level, with two convex regions on
561 either side. Concavity/convexity of shadow prices relate to the signs of third derivatives
562 of the intertemporal welfare function. In other words, the qualitative effect of the second
563 risk-related numerator term in the shadow price equation (7) varies across the domain of the
564 stock. Within a “zone of influence” of the threshold, $V_{sss} = p_{ss} < 0$, so that risk (apart from
565 the endogenous risk effect) tends to undermine the value of marginal investments in natural
566 capital. In other words, the influence of the threshold induces a form of “anti-prudence” or
567 “negative self-insurance” with respect to the valuation of the stock. This occurs because of a
568 “lottery effect” that implies that as volatility increases current holdings of capital have less of
569 an effect on future holdings of capital, which reduces the importance of the tradeoff between
570 harvest today and future opportunities. The effect of the lottery in terms of one’s “destiny”
571 tends to countervail any “self-insurance” benefits of investments in natural capital. Outside
572 of this zone of influence, however, the sign of this term reverses, yielding higher valuations
573 reflecting a degree of prudence.²³

574 The ultimate effect of all these margins on the effect of risk on marginal valuations is
575 complex, depending strongly on the level of risk and the stock level. For a region just above
576 the threshold biomass, adding risk unequivocally reduces the marginal valuation of capital.
577 However, there is a biomass level at which risk has no effect on marginal valuation. Beyond
578 this point the gap between the stochastic and deterministic marginal valuation expands and
579 then contracts, although the shadow price under stochasticity always exceeds the determinis-

²³The “endogenous risk” effect is likewise asymmetric on either side of the threshold, with the effect increasing shadow prices below the threshold and decreasing them above the threshold.

580 tic level. With respect to stock levels below the threshold level, things are more simple. Risk
581 consistently increases the marginal value of the stock relative to the deterministic case since
582 holding more natural capital increases the chance of escaping the lower basin of attraction.

583 Finally, greater levels of risk do not have monotonic effects on the marginal valuation of
584 risk. Figure 9 clearly demonstrates that the stochastic shadow value curves cross in both
585 basins of attraction. Therefore, near the threshold stock, marginal valuation of natural
586 capital falls as stochasticity increases – essentially showing the growing dominance of the
587 “lottery” effect of risk viz a viz the threshold. Yet this effect is reversed at low and high
588 stocks beyond this zone of influence so that risk actually increases the value of investing in
589 the stock – again, reflecting the role of prudence in the second risk term of the asset price
590 equation (7).

591 While stochasticity and non-convexity may have little influence on valuation indepen-
592 dently, the presence of such large and complex valuation effects in such a simple model
593 suggests that it is the *interaction* between stochasticity and non-convexity that is important
594 to understand.

595 6. Conclusion

596 Risk alters the valuation of real assets in two ways. First, investing in capital influences
597 the strength of volatility via an endogenous risk effect. This increment in volatility is valued
598 through the risk aversion (or risk seeking) as embodied in the curvature of the intertemporal
599 welfare function. Second, investments may alter the curvature of the intertemporal welfare
600 function itself, reflecting a form of endogenous risk aversion. Importantly, this risk aver-
601 sion and its rate of change are not primitive features of underlying social preference, rather
602 they are induced intertemporal preferences over capital stocks reflecting characteristics of
603 the instantaneous welfare function, the dynamics of capital accumulation, and the economic
604 program providing a feedback rule between capital stocks and consumption and investment
605 behavior. The behavioral implications of these valuation effects of risk have been extensively

606 cataloged in the macroeconomic literature – albeit primarily in the special case of dynami-
607 cally optimal investment behavior, where the role of the economic program is obscured. The
608 “dual” problem of understanding how risk influences the *valuation* of real assets, *conditional*
609 on their management, has received far less attention.

610 Nowhere is the need to focus on the valuation implications of risk more important than
611 in the case of natural capital, where absence of capital markets, market and governance
612 failures, and sub-optimal management undermine market-derived and optimization-driven
613 valuation approaches alike. Two unique features of natural capital – its non-linear process
614 of accumulation (i.e. non-linear drift) and its often sub-optimal management – are likely to
615 operate upon the risk terms in the asset pricing equation in subtle and important ways that
616 may be distinct from those seen in the macroeconomic consumption-investment literature
617 dominated by linear accumulation rules and dynamically optimal behavior. Through analysis
618 of simple examples, we have shown how stochasticity influences total and marginal valuations
619 of natural capital stocks, assessing the magnitude and direction of its effect.

620 Despite the rich manner in which risk *theoretically* influences the valuation of natural
621 assets, our investigation of the single-stock, logistic model with GBM shocks found that
622 stochasticity has only a minor impact on measures of changes in wealth for marginal and
623 non-marginal perturbations to capital stocks along predetermined economic programs. This
624 result is robust across optimized and non-optimized settings and for quite high (arguably
625 unrealistic) levels of volatility. These results illustrate that the two risk terms can act in a
626 countervailing fashion, so that the qualitative effect of risk is unclear *a priori*. It is possible
627 that in a number of cases that these effects may approximately cancel out.²⁴ While our results
628 are far from exhaustive, the weak effects of risk in a canonical resource model across a range
629 of optimal and non-optimal control results suggests that risk may be a truly second-order
630 concern in some important cases.

631 The statement that risk may be a non-issue for valuation is strongly qualified by our

²⁴Identifying these conditions is an area of important future research.

632 findings for our canonical example of a highly nonlinear resource system with alternative
633 stable states. In this case we find strong and complex effects on the valuation of natural
634 capital in the region of the transition between basins of attraction, where the zone of this
635 influence will scale with the magnitude of the risk. Finally, the magnitude and direction
636 of the bias from ignoring risk is likely to depend on the location of the stock within state
637 space. These results highlight the importance of grounding natural capital valuation in the
638 context of bioeconomic models that clarify the nature of risk’s influence on valuation and
639 the connections among natural dynamics and the revealed economic program.

640 The question of the effect of risk and uncertainty on natural capital valuation is quite
641 broad in scope, and will require a research program to satisfactorily answer. Our pursuit
642 of this question is meant as a starting place and is therefore narrow in focus, with several
643 notable restrictions. First, we focus exclusively on risk, where stochastic processes have
644 known probabilities. We therefore ignore concerns of ambiguity or Knightian uncertainty.
645 Secondly, our theoretical derivations and examples are cast in continuous time and only
646 describe stochastic processes that can be written as diffusions (i.e., Ito processes). Within
647 this class of diffusions, we have limited our attention to GBM processes, whereas a range of
648 other stochastic processes may offer unique insights. Furthermore, economic programs are
649 likewise continuous in time and are functions of contemporaneous state variables. Distinct
650 insights that might arise from consideration of discontinuous shocks (e.g., Poisson shocks)
651 or delayed responsiveness to noisy measurements of the system. Thirdly, we focus solely
652 on stochasticity in stock dynamics. While such “process error” is a significant concern in
653 natural resource management, it is far from the only place where risk may be important. For
654 example, one may be concerned about “implementation error” in the economic program, so
655 that the intended management actions are only implemented approximately. This is of course
656 closely related to specification error - a common concern in econometrics. Finally, while we
657 derive asset pricing equations for multiple correlated natural capital stocks ([Appendix A](#)),
658 our theoretical and empirical focus is solely on the single-stock case. Thus the limitations of

659 our analysis demonstrate the many profitable avenues for elucidating the ways in which risk
660 should alter our valuation of natural assets.

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661 **Appendix A. Multi-stock derivation of valuation formulae**

662 Let $\mathbf{s}(t) \in \mathbb{R}^S$ and $\mathbf{x}(\mathbf{s}(t)) : \mathbb{R}^S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^X$ and extend the diffusion in (1) to S distinct Ito
663 processes

$$ds^i = \mu^i(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{x}(\mathbf{s})) dt + \sigma^i(\mathbf{s}) dZ^i(t) \quad \text{for } i = 1, \dots, S \quad (\text{A.1})$$

664 The $dZ^i(t)$ can be correlated with a $S \times S$ correlation matrix $\boldsymbol{\rho}$ such that the covariance of
665 the stochastic components of capital stocks i and j , which may differ from their observed
666 covariance in-sample due to the presence of deterministic relations between the stocks in
667 (A.1), is $\mathbb{E}_t[\sigma^i(\mathbf{s}) dZ^i(t) \sigma^j(\mathbf{s}) dZ^j(t)] = \sigma^i(\mathbf{s}) \sigma^j(\mathbf{s}) \mathbb{E}_t[dZ^i(t) dZ^j(t)] = \sigma^i(\mathbf{s}) \sigma^j(\mathbf{s}) \rho^{ij} dt$. If $i =$
668 j , then the expression simplifies to $\sigma^i(\mathbf{s})^2 dt$.

669 While the decomposition of the noise into a correlation matrix and standard deviations is
670 intuitive and useful for model parameterization, we work directly with the covariance matrix
671 to conserve on notation. Let $\Omega(\mathbf{s})$ be a $S \times S$ covariance matrix of the noise terms such
672 that $\text{Cov}(ds^i, ds^j) = \Omega^{ij}(\mathbf{s}) dt$. A Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix yields
673 $\Omega(\mathbf{s}) = \omega(\mathbf{s})\omega(\mathbf{s})'$.²⁵

Redefine the instantaneous return functions and intertemporal welfare functions in the
multi-stock case as $W(\mathbf{s}(t), \mathbf{x}(\mathbf{s}(t)))$ and $V(\mathbf{s}(t))$. Once again, we know that $\frac{dV}{dt} = \frac{\mathbb{E}_t[dV]}{dt}$.
Applying Ito's Lemma (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) yields:

$$dV(\mathbf{s}) = \left[\sum_{j=1}^S \mu^j(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{x}(\mathbf{s})) V_{s^j} + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j=1}^S \sum_{k=1}^S \Omega^{jk}(\mathbf{s}) V_{s^j s^k} \right] dt + \sum_{j=1}^S \sigma^j(\mathbf{s}) V_{s^j} dZ^j$$

674 Finding the expected value and dividing through by dt :

$$\frac{dV}{dt} = \frac{\mathbb{E}_t[dV]}{dt} = \left[\sum_{j=1}^S \mu^j(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{x}(\mathbf{s})) V_{s^j} + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j=1}^S \sum_{k=1}^S \Omega^{jk}(\mathbf{s}) V_{s^j s^k} \right] \quad (\text{A.2})$$

²⁵This approach generalizes (A.1) slightly by technically allowing for the *correlation* matrix - not just the standard deviations - to vary in the stock vector.

675 Setting (A.2) equal to the multidimensional generalization of (3) yields the HJB equation.

$$\delta V(\mathbf{s}) = W(\mathbf{s}(t), \mathbf{x}(\mathbf{s}(t))) + \left[\sum_{j=1}^S \mu^j(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{x}(\mathbf{s})) V_{s^j} + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j=1}^S \sum_{k=1}^S \Omega^{jk}(\mathbf{s}) V_{s^j s^k} \right] \quad (\text{A.3})$$

676 Partial differentiation of (A.3) yields the following expression for the shadow price of s^i

$$p^i(\mathbf{s}) = \frac{W_{s^i} + \left(\frac{\partial p^i}{\partial s^i} \mu^i + \sum_{j \neq i}^S \frac{\partial p^j}{\partial s^i} \mu^j \right) + \sum_{j \neq i}^S p^j \mu_{s^i}^j + \frac{1}{2} \sum_j^S \sum_k^S \left(\Omega_{s^i}^{jk} \frac{\partial p^j}{\partial s^k} + \Omega^{jk} \frac{\partial^2 p^j}{\partial s^k \partial s^i} \right)}{\delta - \mu_{s^i}^i}$$

Factoring the final numerator term yields the final asset pricing equation.

$$p^i(\mathbf{s}) = \left[W_{s^i} + \left(\frac{\partial p^i}{\partial s^i} \mu^i + \sum_{j \neq i}^S \frac{\partial p^j}{\partial s^i} \mu^j \right) + \sum_{j \neq i}^S p^j \mu_{s^i}^j + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j=1}^S \left(\sigma_{s^i}^{2j} \frac{\partial p^j}{\partial s^j} + \sigma^{2j} \frac{\partial^2 p^j}{\partial s^j \partial s^i} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j=1}^S \sum_{k \neq j}^S \left(\Omega_{s^i}^{jk} \frac{\partial p^j}{\partial s^k} + \Omega^{jk} \frac{\partial^2 p^j}{\partial s^k \partial s^i} \right) \right] / \left(\delta - \mu_{s^i}^i \right) \quad (\text{A.4})$$

677 The first numerator term in (A.4) has the same interpretation as in the single-asset case. The
 678 next two terms in the numerator are present in the deterministic multi-asset case (Yun et al.,
 679 2017) and are forms of “capital gains.” The second numerator term $\left(\frac{\partial p^i}{\partial s^i} \mu^i + \sum_{j \neq i}^S \frac{\partial p^j}{\partial s^i} \mu^j \right)$
 680 reflects the effects of investment in s^i on the shadow price of stock i due to its prices of all
 681 assets in the portfolio (i.e. “price effects”). The third numerator term $\sum_{j \neq i}^S p^j \mu_{s^i}^j$ captures
 682 the deterministic effects of investment in stock i on the physical growth rates of all other
 683 stocks (“cross-stock effects”), which can stem from system ecology or production interactions
 684 within the economic program.

685 The additional numerator terms in (A.4) only exist in the stochastic case. The third
 686 term $\frac{1}{2} \sum_{j=1}^S \left(\sigma_{s^i}^{2j} \frac{\partial p^j}{\partial s^j} + \sigma^{2j} \frac{\partial^2 p^j}{\partial s^j \partial s^i} \right)$ operates solely through the individual variances of each
 687 asset and captures the “risk sensitivity” effect of an investment in asset i on the variance
 688 of each asset, $\sigma_{s^i}^{2j} \frac{\partial p^j}{\partial s^j}$. This part of the term reflects how substitution and complementarity
 689 relationships can provide “self-protection” through “portfolio diversification,” which is the

690 endogenous risk concept. Importantly, the $\sigma^{2j} \frac{\partial^2 p^j}{\partial s^j \partial s^i}$ term represents prudence and accounts
691 for the fact that investments in i also affects the *sensitivity* to risk for all S assets, $\sigma^{2j} \frac{\partial^2 p^j}{\partial s^j \partial s^i}$,
692 even if the variance for these other assets remains unchanged by the investment. This means
693 that this term influences the consequences of stochastic events, and can be thought of as a
694 self-insurance term. Together, these terms mirror the numerator terms, $\sigma(s)p_s + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2(s)p_{ss}$,
695 in (7).

696 The final term in the numerator of (A.4), $\frac{1}{2} \sum_{j=1}^S \sum_{k \neq j}^S \left(\Omega_{s^i}^{jk} \frac{\partial p^j}{\partial s^k} + \Omega^{jk} \frac{\partial^2 p^j}{\partial s^k \partial s^i} \right)$, reflects the
697 risk-related effects of investing in asset i that are mediated through the *covariances* of assets
698 in the portfolio. This term is zero in the case that natural capital stocks are uncorrelated
699 regardless of the vector of capital stocks. $\Omega_{s^i}^{jk} \frac{\partial p^j}{\partial s^k}$ is the effect of an investment in i on the
700 covariances between other assets j, k as valued through the first cross-partial between these
701 assets (i.e. the 2nd cross-partial of the intertemporal welfare function). If the covariances
702 between asset stocks are invariant to capital stocks then this term is zero. $\Omega^{jk} \frac{\partial^2 p^j}{\partial s^k \partial s^i}$ reflects
703 the fact that investing in i may itself affect the curvature of the intertemporal welfare function
704 in the direction of k and i (i.e. $\frac{\partial^2 p^j}{\partial s^k \partial s^i} = \frac{\partial}{\partial s^i} V_{s^j s^k}$). If the effect of increasing asset i is to
705 increase the concavity in the direction of increases in j and k ($\frac{\partial^2 p^j}{\partial s^k \partial s^i} < 0$) then the existence of
706 positive correlation between the latter two assets results in a compensating reduction in the
707 asset price. This creates addition “self insurance” opportunities from portfolio diversification.

708 Some insight on the numerator terms involving covariances can be gleaned by realiz-
709 ing that the covariance between innovations in s^j (the residual of changes in s^j after the
710 deterministic drift $\mu^j(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{x}(\mathbf{s}))$ is differenced away) and innovations in s^k can be viewed as
711 their rescaled relationship in expectation. Specifically, if the conditional expectation of s^j
712 and s^k is linear²⁶ $\mathbb{E}[ds^j | ds^k] = \beta ds^k$, then it is well known that $\beta = \frac{\Omega^{jk}}{\sigma^{2k}}$. In other words,
713 the covariance terms in (A.4) reflect the expected marginal effect of ds^k on ds^j such that
714 the risk terms in the multivariate asset case account for systematic (linear) cross-effects be-

²⁶Linearity of the conditional mean follows directly from the joint normality assumption for Ito processes.

715 tween perturbations in stocks in a way that is analogous to how the previous cross-terms
716 in the numerator account for capital gains through deterministic relationships via price and
717 cross-stock effects.

718 Finally, it is noteworthy that the effects of stochasticity disappear from (A.4) when two
719 conditions hold: 1) when all second moments are constant regardless of the stock levels, and
720 2) the intertemporal welfare function, V , is quadratic such that investments have no effect
721 on its curvature. However, since the intertemporal welfare function inherits the properties
722 of the instantaneous benefits function, the economic program, and biophysical dynamics in
723 a complex manner, the latter property is difficult to verify *ex ante*.

724 The numerical approximation of the shadow price function is carried out using “value
725 function approximation” and is detailed in ???. As detailed in Fenichel, Abbott, and Yun
726 (2018) for the deterministic case and employed in Yun et al. (2017), this approach uses a
727 Chebyshev polynomial basis to approximate the intertemporal welfare function using the
728 HJB equation. We then differentiate the HJB equation to obtain estimates of the shadow
729 prices.

730 Appendix B. Numerical approximation

731 Fenichel, Abbott, and Yun (2018) and Yun et al. (2017) describe how the HJB equation
732 can be combined with functional approximation approaches frequently used in numerical
733 dynamic programming to approximate the entire shadow price *function* over a closed do-
734 main of capital stocks. For the deterministic, multi-asset case they advocate approximating
735 $V(\mathbf{s}(t))$ using the HJB equation (analogous to (A.3)), replacing $V(\mathbf{s}(t))$ on the LHS of the
736 equation with a weighted sum of the tensor product of Chebyshev basis functions in the
737 stock vector $\mathbf{s}(t)$ and replacing the partial derivatives of the value function on the RHS with
738 the partial derivatives of this approximation. The coefficients that determine the weightings
739 on the basis functions can be solved analytically and are chosen (in a system with as many
740 approximation points as coefficients) to make the LHS and RHS of the approximated HJB

741 equation hold with equality.²⁷

742 This value (intertemporal welfare) function approximation technique can be adapted
 743 with relatively minor changes to the stochastic diffusion case. First, define the bounded
 744 approximation interval for each state variable. Then choose M evaluation points within this
 745 interval for each of the S capital stocks and then calculate $W(\mathbf{s}(t), x(\mathbf{s}(t))), \mu(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{x}(\mathbf{s}))$
 746 and $\Omega(\mathbf{s})$ at each point.²⁸ The univariate node coordinates are then permuted to yield
 747 M^S grid points. We define ϕ^i as the $M \times (q^i + 1)$ basis matrix of q^i th degree for state
 748 variable i . This is a matrix of $q^i + 1$ basis functions - Chebyshev polynomials of ascending
 749 degree in our case - evaluated at the M evaluation points. To approximate over the bounded
 750 domain in \mathbb{R}^S we find the tensor product across all dimensions (i.e. allow for full interactions
 751 across the univariate basis functions) to form an $M^S \times \prod_{i=1}^S (q^i + 1)$ basis matrix: $\Phi(\mathbf{S}) =$
 752 $\phi^N \otimes \phi^{N-1} \otimes \dots \otimes \phi^1$ where \mathbf{S} is the $M^S \times S$ matrix of evaluation points (i.e. all grid nodes
 753 of M evaluation points for all S state variables). We can now define our approximation to
 754 the intertemporal welfare function $V(\mathbf{S}^m) \approx \Phi^m(\mathbf{S})\beta$ where m indexes the M^S distinct
 755 capital stock vectors (i.e. the individual evaluation points in the S -dimensional grid) and
 756 \mathbf{S}^m is the m th row of \mathbf{S} . $\Phi^m(\mathbf{S})$ is the m th row of $\Phi(\mathbf{S})$, and β is a $\prod_{i=1}^S (q^i + 1) \times 1$
 757 vector of unknown approximation coefficients. Using the fact that $\frac{\partial V(\mathbf{S}^m)}{\partial s^i} \approx \left(\frac{\partial \Phi^m(\mathbf{S})}{\partial s^i}\right)\beta$
 758 and $\frac{\partial^2 V(\mathbf{S}^m)}{\partial s^i \partial s^j} \approx \left(\frac{\partial^2 \Phi^m(\mathbf{S})}{\partial s^i \partial s^j}\right)\beta$ we can replace the HJB equation in (A.3) with the following

²⁷In some cases it may be desirable to utilize more approximation nodes than the number of coefficients - an over-determined system. In this case, the coefficients can be chosen to minimize the sum of squared deviations between the LHS and RHS of the approximation. The analytical expression for this solution is analogous to ordinary least squares (Fenichel, Abbott, and Yun, 2018).

²⁸In many cases the evaluation nodes are found by finding the M roots of a unidimensional Chebyshev polynomial on the bounded approximation range for each state variable. However, care must be taken so that the nodes are laid out in a way that the system dynamics do not leave the approximating domain in expectation.

759 approximation:

$$\begin{aligned} \delta\Phi^m(\mathbf{S})\beta = W(\mathbf{S}^m) + & \left[\sum_{j=1}^S \text{diag}(\mu^j(\mathbf{S}^m)) \left(\frac{\partial\Phi^m(\mathbf{S})}{\partial s^j} \right) \beta \right. \\ & \left. + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j=1}^S \sum_{k=1}^S \text{diag}(\Omega^{jk}(\mathbf{S}^m)) \left(\frac{\partial^2\Phi^m(\mathbf{S})}{\partial s^j \partial s^k} \right) \beta \right] \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.1})$$

760 Collecting terms involving β yields:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left[\delta\Phi^m(\mathbf{S}) - \sum_{j=1}^S \text{diag}(\mu^j(\mathbf{S}^m)) \left(\frac{\partial\Phi^m(\mathbf{S})}{\partial s^j} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j=1}^S \sum_{k=1}^S \text{diag}(\Omega^{jk}(\mathbf{S}^m)) \left(\frac{\partial^2\Phi^m(\mathbf{S})}{\partial s^j \partial s^k} \right) \right] \beta \\ & = \Psi^m(\mathbf{S})\beta = W(\mathbf{S}^m) \end{aligned}$$

761 Stacking these M^S vector equations results in the equation $\Psi(\mathbf{S})\beta = W(\mathbf{S})$. If $M^S =$
762 $\prod_{i=1}^S (q^i + 1)$ (i.e. the number of approximation points equals the number of unknown ap-
763 proximation coefficients) then the approximation coefficients can be calculated in a straight
764 foward way through matrix inversion. Alternatively, if $M^S > \prod_{i=1}^S (q^i + 1)$ then the β can
765 be found using least squares.

$$\beta = (\Psi(\mathbf{S})'\Psi(\mathbf{S}))^{-1} \Psi(\mathbf{S})'W(\mathbf{S}) \quad (\text{B.2})$$


766 After obtaining the approximation $\Phi(\mathbf{S})$ it is straightforward to find the shadow values
767 of any given capital stock by taking its partial derivative.

768 [Fenichel, Abbott, and Yun \(2018\)](#) discuss the importance of determining the domain
769 of approximation. They show that in multi-dimensional systems the system dynamics to
770 can lead outside the approximation domain, which hinders the ability to recover shadow
771 prices. They argue that it is important to make sure the approximation domain is sufficient
772 to include dynamic from any stock size for which a shadow price is desired. In the single
773 stock deterministic case this is never an issue so long as the system has attractors that are


774 within the approximation domain. However, this property does not extend to stochastic
775 dynamics. This is because a shock at the edge of the approximation domain could lead the
776 system outside the approximation domain for a non-trivial period of time. Therefore, extra
777 attention is likely needed to enlarge the approximation domain when system dynamics are
778 stochastic.

779 **Appendix C. Numerical Performance Comparison: Chebyshev vs. Brute Force**


780 The Pindyck example presented in Section 3 is useful since it provides a known closed-
781 form solution for the intertemporal welfare function. We use it to compare the accuracy
782 of the numerical approximation of Chebyshev polynomial approximation and the “brute
783 force” forward simulation approach. For this comparison, 35 Chebyshev polynomial nodes
784 for 35th order (exactly identified) are applied for Chebyshev polynomial approximation. In
785 the brute force approximation, 0.01 time interval for the final time 200 are replicated for
786 20000 stochastic simulations. The graphical comparison across the closed form solution,
787 Chebyshev polynomial approximations, and brute force forward simulation are shown in
788 Figure (C.10). Panel (a) of Figure (C.10) is the closed form solution of the value function for
789 the deterministic and stochastic models. The other panels in Figure (C.10) are a graphical
790 comparison of the closed form solution (black), Chebyshev polynomial approximation (red),
791 and brute force forward simulation (blue) across different volatility levels.




(a) Closed form solution



(b) $\sigma = 0.1$



(c) $\sigma = 0.2$



(d) $\sigma = 0.3$

Figure C.10: Comparisons of numerical approximations of Pindyck model: Closed form solution vs. Chebyshev polynomial approximation and brute force forward simulation.

Table C.2: Comparison of numerical performances: Chebyshev polynomial and brute force approximation results are compared with the closed form solution.

	Chebyshev		Brute Force	
	RMSE	Running Time	RMSE	Running Time
$\sigma = 0.1$	4.19e-07	0.11 sec.	0.0096	121.40 min.
$\sigma = 0.2$	1.95e-05	0.84 sec.	0.0650	126.54 min.
$\sigma = 0.3$	0.0041	0.10 sec.	0.1336	127.11 min.

792 Table C.2 presents the numerical performances of Chebyshev polynomial and brute force
793 approximation. It is obvious that Chebyshev polynomial approximation dominates the error
794 size and running time for all volatility cases. If Chebyshev polynomial approximation works,
795 its approximation performances are expected to be better than that brute force approxima-
796 tion provides. However, Chebyshev polynomial approximation often crashes its performance
797 (e.g., our cubic growth example) or produces overfitting issues (e.g., overly wavy curves).
798 Since the true value function is unknown in many general cases, Chebyshev polynomial ap-
799 proximation is not always applicable or the best. This is generally true for the most of
800 global approximation methods not limited to Chebyshev polynomial approximation. Nu-
801 merical performances of the brute force approximation is really variable. Even though its
802 expensive computational burden, the brute force approximation has its own value. First of
803 all, brute force approximation is not likely to fail for producing its results. This means that
804 brute force approximation is mostly applicable for where the global approximation methods
805 fails. Also, the brute force approximation can provide the best guess about how the true
806 value function is shaped. With the abundant computational resources, the approximation
807 error size could be reduced extremely. With $\sigma = 0.1$ simulation, the RMSE is 0.1330, 0.0096,
808 1.81e-05 and for 10000, 20000, and 30000 stochastic simulations. Using the parallel com-
809 puting resources, the approximation error size and computation time could be reduced in a
810 favorable level. As an independent approximator or first snapshot provider of value function,
811 in general, the brute force approach compares favorably to the Chebyshev approach (or any
812 other global approximation approaches). **In the conference version of this paper we will have**
813 **a complete numerical comparison of these methods.**